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An important decision, not yet reported, has just been rend-
ered by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in the appeal from the
order of the Probate Court distributing to the residuary legatees
certain funds of the estate of William Leffingwell received by the
administrator in settlement of claims against the United States
Government, commonly known as the French Spoliation Claims.
The reason for appeal is summed up briefly as follows: That the
sum received by said administrator "was received by him in
behalf of and as representing the next of kin of said William Lef-
fingwell, and was not received by him as part of the estate of the
said William Leffingwell, or as assets thereof."
It appears that William Leffingwell died in 1834, leaving a will
in which, after disposing of the bulk of his property, there was a
clause dividing the remainder of the estate among certain residuary
legatees.
In his lifetime he had been part owner of the ship "Confeder-
acy," captured by the French in 1797 and afterward condemned
and sold. By the act of Congress of x885, means were provided
for ascertaining the claims of American citizens to legal idemnity
for spoliations committed by the French prior to July r8ox, and,
on investigation in accordance with the terms of this act, it was
decided that the seizure and condemnation as above related were
illegal, that the claim was valid, and the amount of idemnity was
determined. By the act of March 3 rd, 1891, an appropriation was
made by Congress to pay the amount so determined. It was
received shortly after by the administrator, who, as suggested
above, turned it over in equal parts to the residuary legatees, in
accordance with the order of the Probate Court.
The question, on which the decision of this appeal depended,
as to whether the sum should be held to be assets of the estate, or
was received by the administrator on behalf of and as representing
the next of kin, largely depended on the intention of Congress as
indicated by the act of March 3 rd, 1891.
An examination of the speeches and reports in cases where these
claims were the subject of inquiry, led the court to conclude that
it was the intention of Congress that said claims should be consid-
ered as property belonging to the estate. Likewise the Court of
Claims regarded the sum awarded by it as assets of the estates of
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the claimants. This view is further strengthened by the Mas-
sachusetts case of Balch v. Blagge, not yet reported, where it was
held that Congress intended the money to be paid as part of the
estates of the original sufferers, and that if it had been the intention
that the awards should be paid to or for the benefit of those next
of kin, it would have been easy to say so in a few words.
The act of March 3 rd, x891, however, provided "that in all
cases where the original sufferers were adjudicated bankrupts the
award shall be made on behalf of the next of kin, instead of to
assignees in bankruptcy, and the awards in the cases of individual
claimants shall not be paid until the Court of Claims shall certify
to the Secretary of the Treasury that the personal representatives
on whose behalf the award is made represent the next of kin, and
the courts which granted the administrations respectively shall
have certified that the legal representatives have given adequate
security for the legal disbursements of the awards." It was con-
tended that this is clearly indicative of an intent to make a direct
gift to the next of kin of William Leffingwell, the original claim-
ant.
This proviso was contsidered by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania "In the matter of Clements' estates," 23 Atl. Rep. 631, and
the reasoning of the court in that case was adopted in the case
under discussion. If the above contention were true then it is evi-
dent that the administrator must have received the money as trus-
tee and as no part of the estate of William Leffingwell. But, from
the very terms of the proviso itself, it is clear that the money
appropriated to pay their claim should be paid to the admin-
istrator in his capacity as administrator, and not as trustee. The
last clause of the sentence quoted leaves no doubt that "legal
representatives of decedents, executors and administrators, were
intended to be the recipients and upon the trusts declared and
appointed by the law of their plaintiff's domicil." By the law of
Connecticut administration is granted by the Courts of Probate
which have power to take security for the administration of decedent
estates, but not for the execution of trusts. "The power and
jurisdiction of these courts may be presumed to have been known
to Congress, and therefore, when it required the Secretary of the
Treasury to be certified by them ' that the legal representatives
have given adequate security for the legal disbursements of the
awards,' it must be presumed to have intended such security as
they could take and certify. Requiring then as condition prece-
dent to the payment of the award that the administrator should
have given security as such, according to the laws of Connecticut,
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for the legal disbursement of the same, it must have intended
that the disbursement should be in accordance with the conditions
of that security, viz, to the persons who were entitled to partici-
pate in the distribution of the estate upon which the administrator
was acting: These are the persons who are described in the act
as next of kin."
An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States has been
taken in this case.
The confiscation by the Federal Government of the property
of those who entered the Confederate service in the civil war was
the occasion of an interesting and rather curious question, which
has come before the courts at -various times since the close of the
war, and is discussed by the United States Supreme Court in the
recent case of Jenkins v. Collard, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 868. By Act of
Congress of July 17th, 1862, all the real property of one engaged
in the rebellion was declared forfeited to the government during
the period of his natural life. The life estate having been con-
demned and sold by the government under this act, what was the
situation of the fee or reversionary interest? As upon the death
of the offender his heirs took the property, the logical conclusion
would seem to be that they took it by descent from him and that
even after the confiscation proceedings, the reversionary interest
or remainder still vested in him. But in Wallach v. Van Riswick,
92 U. S. 207, and several cases following it, the court held that
since the intent of the confiscation act was to enfeeble the enemy
by preventing its adherents from using their property in its sup-
port, therefore after a sale of the enemy's land under the act,
there was left in him no interest which he could convey by deed.
Subsequently however in Avegno v. Schmidt, 113 U. S. 293, and
Shields v. Schiff, 124 U. S. 355, it was decided that the heirs at law
of the person whose life estate had been confiscated took by
descent from him and not from the United States.
Where then dwelt the naked fee during the life of the offender,
or in the picturesque language of Mr. Justice Bradley, what was
"the intermediate state in which the disembodied shade of naked
ownership may have wandered during the period of its ambiguous
existence ?" The court held that the fee or remainder still contin-
ued in the original owner but without the power of alienation,
and that it was therefore "a mere dead estate, or in a condition
of suspended animation." The proclamation of pardon and
amnesty made by the President December 25 th, i868, removed
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this disability and restored to the offender the power of dispos-
ing of his reversionary interest. The court in Jenkins v. Collerd,
held, however, that when the rebel had before the proclamation of
amnesty given a warranty deed of the property, though the deed
conveyed nothing, it operated as an estoppel and prevented him
from asserting title to the property after his disability had been
removed by the amnesty.
A decision tending toward uniformity of law in the circuit
courts and probably decisive of the question whether or not the
contract of a stevedore is maritime in its nature, with its conse-
quent lien, has just been handed down in the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case of Dennett v. The
Main, 5' Fed. Rep. 954. The decisions have generally been
in favor of the lien, save in the fifth circuit where the invariable
rule has been against such a lien since the decision of Mr. Justice
Bradley in The 11ex, 2 Woods 229, which decision is now over-
ruled by a unanimous court. In the reported decision the court
says: "A vessel, in taking on and u~loading cargo, is earning
freight; for, in loading and unloading, services are rendered, the
expense of which necessarily enters into the affreightment con-
tract. * * * It must be conceded that when the ship has
finished its transit, the cargo must be unloaded. It must also be
conceded that cargo delivered on the wharf is at the risk of the
ship and must be loaded. Furnishers of supplies, like coal, to a
steamship in a foreign port, preparing for a voyage, are conceded
to have a maritime lien; but coal supplied and deposited on the
wharf would be of no avail to the ship unless taken on board.
We therefore conclude that on principle and weight of authority
the services rendered by a stevedore to a ship in taking in and
stowing and discharging cargo in a foreign port are services of a
maritime nature from which a maritime lien results."
This decision removes the stumbling block found in The IRex,
supra, and kindred decisions in the fifth circuit, so we may say
that the present rule in the United States gives a maritime lien in
favor of a stevedore for his services rendered in a foreign port.
(See The Maritime Lien, II. YALE LAW JOURNAL 9.)
The doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the leading cases of Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing .Dis-
trie, 120 U. S. 489, and Ficklen v. Taxing District, 145 U. S., have
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been previously considered in these columns. It will be remem-
bered that in the former case, under a statute of the State of
Tennessee, a tax was attempted to be collected from a drummer
selling goods by sample as the representative of an Ohio firm.
The U. S. Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, held-Mr. Chief Justice Waite, Mr. Justice
Field and Mr. Justice Gray dissenting-that this was a regulation
of inter-State commerce and therefore in violation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. The Ficklen case arose under the
same statute, but here the question was as to its constitutionality
when applied to a commission merchant having a place of busi-
ness and doing a general commission business within the taxing
district. To the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the tax
in this instance Mr. Justice Harlan alone dissented. The ques-
tion involved in Robbins v. Taxing District, has again arisen in
Hurford v. State, 20 S. W. Rep. 201 (Tenn.X and the decision fol-
lows that in the Robbins case. The opinion of the court, written
by Mr. Justice Lurton draws a clear distinction between the two
cases mentioned above. However we cannot help wondering
whether, in view of the strong dissenting opinion in the Robbins
case and the facts there pointed out by Chief Justice Waite, the
Tennessee court was not somewhat reluctant to reverse its first
decision; and whether it is not after all, extremely difficult for
the average mind to regard this "drummer tax" as a regulation
of inter-State commerce rather than as a tax on the privilege of
carrying on a certain business within a certain territory.
How far a municipal corporation may regulate a square or
park within its limits, which it has dedicated to the public, is
always an interesting question in every city which is extending its
public improvements in that direction, but especially in New
Haven, where the rights of the city fathers over "the Green"
has always been a fruitful subject for legal discussion and histori-
cal research. A recent decision in Ohio (Gleason et al. v. City of
Cleveland. 31 N. E. Rep. 802), may throw a little light on what such
a dedication really implies. In 1796 the Connecticut Land Company
laid out the city of Cleveland, assigning a certain part as "a square."
This was used for different purposes of varying public character
until 1858,
- 
when the city assumed control of the space and
beautified it as a park. In 189E full power was given to the
board of park commissioners by the legislature to "take charge
and have the entire management, control and regulation
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of all public grounds and parks belonging to the city." In
188o an act was passed by the legislature, making an appro-
priation, to erect a soldiers' monument and the governor was
empowered to appoint a committee with power to act in all mat-
ters necessary for its completion. For its site they selected the
square in question, against the consent of the city park commission
and an injunction was granted in the lower court to prevent its erec-
tion there. The Supreme Court however held, that "the donation of
'the public square' in the city of Cleveland by the Connecticut Land
Company was not made to the city of Cleveland but to the public
generally" and "it was therefore competent for the legislature
to authorize the erection of a soldiers' monument" (this being a
work of a public character and for the benefit of all) "upon this
square without the consent of the city."
